RATIONALISATION OF ROTARY WING AIRCRAFT IN THE ADF
1. The objectives of the Defence Evaluation Review
(DER) were to shape management practices for the future, forge links with
industry, and through these processes and other efficiencies, free up resources
for the development of combat power. The Defence Reform Programme (DRP) was the
process to implement these changes and allow resources to be transferred from
the 'blunt end' to the 'sharp end' of the ADF. The ADF must not rest on its
laurels if it wishes to extract savings while achieving new capability, and
maintaining its existing capability in an increasingly complex environment with
2. An important element of air power within the ADF
is provided by the rotary wing aircraft currently operated by the Royal
Australian Navy (RAN) and the Australian Regular Army (ARA). While the number
of actual helicopters in the ADF is low compared to larger military forces, the
RAN currently operates four helicopter types and has signed a contract for a fifth
type. The ARA currently operates four helicopter fleets and has expressed
interest in other types for battlefield support. In the cost-driven climate
that the ADF is now operating in, it should be possible to conduct the required
operational tasks with significantly fewer helicopter types.
3. Tooth-to-Tail Ratio. It must be remembered that each different
operational aircraft type carries with it a 'tail' that is significantly more
expensive over the life of the aircraft than was the initial procurement cost.
This 'tail' consists of the cost of aircrew and groundcrew training as well as
the logistic support system including engineering and supply. Many of these
costs are not dependent on the number of aircraft in service so the greater
number of helicopter fleets in service, the worse will be the 'tooth-to-tail'
ratio. One of the easiest ways to maximise this 'tooth-to tail' ratio is to
consolidate rotary wing fleets to the absolute minimum number of aircraft types
4. This paper will describe the current status of
the rotary wing aircraft types in the ADF. Then, foreign examples of fleet
rationalisation and options for reducing the number of ADF fleets will be
discussed. Finally, the paper will conclude with recommendations which would
provide combat capable rotary wing assets given the current ADF fiscal
constraints. This paper will not address the detailed costs of either the
current fleets or the proposed solutions as it is seeking to provide a conceptual
base for future rotary wing acquisitions and decisions.
5. The aim of this service paper is to determine
how best to provide the ADF with cost-effective and combat capable rotary wing
aircraft into the 21st century.
ADF ROTARY WING AIRCRAFT CURRENT SITUATION
6. The ability to project air power using
helicopters is essential to both the ARA and the RAN. For the ARA, the current
fleets do not just provide desired air support, they represent a primary
manoeuvre element which is vital to ground combat power. Embarked helicopters
give a RAN Task Group Commander the ability to fight the war using the element
of surprise and without placing valuable surface assets in danger. In the event
of a submarine threat, the vulnerable warships can escape leaving the
helicopters to employ their advantages of speed and mobility to prosecute the
7. In a world not constrained by either personnel
numbers or fiscal resources, it may be desirable to have a different airframe,
avionics fit, weapon system and aircrew for every task. Much time is spent on
discussing the required helicopter fleet size to achieve critical mass in
different military forces. Calculating the fleet size to provide critical mass
is a function of many different variables and can be quite subjective.
8. General consensus in the Canadian Forces (CF)
and United States Navy (USN) is that a fleet needs to have more than 30
helicopters in operation so that the engineering, supply and training costs can
be fully amortised. As the USN fleet of H-3 Sea Kings dropped from hundreds to
35, they ceased some of their own depot level maintenance and married up with the
Canadian contractors already maintaining Canadian Sea Kings. The drop below
critical mass led them to let contracts to Spar for gearboxes and IMP for
9. Fleets below 10 helicopters are generally considered
too cost-prohibitive to operate and are only maintained if there is no
absolutely no other alternative. Assuming that the ADF accepted the requirement
to have more than a 30-helicopter fleet in service, only the ARA Black Hawk and
Kiowa fleets would have the 'critical mass' to justify overall weapon system
10. Sea Kings. These 1960's generation helicopters were designed
by Sikorsky, built by Westland, and purchased for their anti-submarine warfare (ASW)
capability along with secondary roles of search and rescue (SAR) and utility.
They were operated from the aircraft carrier HMAS Melbourne. After the carrier
was removed from service, they have essentially been shore-based and the
remaining seven have had most of their ASW equipment removed. The most
important capability that the ADF lost was the ability to 'dip' using the AN/AQS-13
variable depth active sonar. A medium frequency variable depth dipping sonar
like the AN/AQS-13 is essential for detecting, localising and attacking
conventional submarines in littoral waters. The Sea Kings are now employed
primarily for utility with a secondary role of SAR.
11. Kiowas. The Bell 206B-1 Kiowas were purchased in 1971 for
both the Army and the Navy. The first 12 were imported and the remaining 44 were
assembled in Australia by Commonwealth Aircraft Corporation (CAC). A RAN Kiowa
was first used for embarked operations when an air detachment was formed in
HMAS Adelaide for a deployment to RIMPAC 84; however, they are no longer operated from
the FFG7 Adelaide class frigates. The RAN currently
operates three Kiowas and they are used for vertical replenishing (VERTREP), inserting
and extracting survey teams, and SAR. HMAS Moresby has one Kiowa attached full
time when conducting oceanographic survey.
12. Squirrels. The AS 350B Squirrel was designed and built in
France by Aerospatiale as a replacement for the Alouette. This RAN model first
flew in 1984 and was delivered to HMAS Albatross for pilot conversion and fleet support.
The RAN first embarked the Squirrel in 1985 and modified it for sea operations
by adding floats, a hoist and a Doppler navigation system. The fleet of six was
used to provide interim air capability awaiting the Seahawks, and are now used as
the second helicopter on the FFG7 Adelaide class frigates. Two Squirrels saw
action in the Persian Gulf. With a toned down paint scheme and a 7.62 mm
machine gun, they were nicknamed the 'Battle Budgies'. 2
13. Seahawks. The Australian S-70B-2 Seahawk is an export
derivative of the US SH-60B LAMPS Mark III and the fleet of 16 have a unique
weapons fit. The Australian version was ordered in 1984 and first flew in 1987.
Due to delays in prototype testing, they were not delivered until 1991. 3 Flight testing is still being carried
out on the primary tactical and navigation functions of the Seahawk. They are
capable of autonomous ASW using their sonobuoy processor (Computing Devices
Canada AN/UYS-503) and their magnetic anomaly detector (CAE AN/ASQ-504V). They
can conduct anti-surface warfare (ASuW) surveillance, targeting and attacking
independent of their parent ship. These aircraft were purchased to be embarked
on the FFG7 Adelaide class frigates, and when not embarked,
are based at HMAS Albatross. The first four FFG7s were built in the US and
their ship-helicopter interface was designed for the Kaman SH-2G. The late
decision to purchase Seahawks meant that flight deck modifications were
required to embark the Seahawk.
14. Super Sea Sprite
Purchase. After considering the RAN helicopters
that are currently in service, it is necessary to discuss those under contract.
On 17 January 1997, Australia signed a contract to purchase a different
helicopter type for the ANZAC frigates. Even though the ship-helicopter interface
on the ANZAC was designed for the Sikorsky Seahawk, the decision was made to
purchase 11 Kaman SH-2G Super Sea Sprites. These SH-2G helicopters have been
removed from service by the USN, and are only currently in service with the
Arab Republic of Egypt. The Egyptian Navy is hardly a bluewater
Navy, and received their SH-2Gs in a special arrangement through the United
States Foreign Military Sales (FMS) when the USN no longer required them. The
Royal New Zealand Navy (RNZN) followed Australia's lead and signed a contract
for SH-2Gs on 11 March 1997. New Zealand, however, did not design their ANZAC
ship-helicopter interface for the Seahawk and had no interest in an aircraft
the size of a Seahawk as the RNZN only embarks small rotary wing aircraft on
15. The rationale for the RAN decision to purchase
a small helicopter instead of the Seahawk was given as desire for commonality
of airframes if helicopters were purchased for the proposed Offshore Patrol
Combatant (OPC). Also, it had been expected that the RAN would purchase 14
helicopters for the eight ANZAC frigates. The introduction of only 11 aircraft
of a unique type will cause major problems well into the future. When allowance
is made for two or three in light and heavy maintenance, it can be predicted
that there will be a constant turmoil between training and operations. A fleet
this size, spread over eight combatants, is a recipe for future logistic and
16. The decision to choose the SH-2G instead of a
Seahawk means that the ANZAC frigate will have a significantly reduced fighting
capability. Most Navies in the world choose to place as large a helicopter as
possible onboard a frigate to maximise combat effectiveness. The operational
payload of the SH-2G (1800 kgs) is just over half that of a Seahawk (3000 kgs),
and this factor becomes critical during over-the-horizon ASuW operations. A
Seahawk can carry two Penguin air-to-surface missiles, while the SH-2G can
carry only one with sufficient fuel to conduct an ASuW mission. The ANZAC
frigate, unlike the FFG7 Adelaide class frigates, is capable of carrying only one embarked helicopter. It
becomes obvious that an ASuW encounter with even two combat units could be
disastrous. The ANZAC frigate project team was forward thinking when it allowed
'room for growth' onboard the ship. 4 An S-70B-2 would have allowed the ANZAC helicopter project team that
same room for growth. Growth has been required on almost every embarked
helicopter in the past, and could be crucial in the field of ASW if the RAN
decides in future to resume active dipping with a tethered sonar.
17. Iroquois. The Bell UH-1H Iroquois is a 1960's generation
helicopter purchased by the RAAF during the Vietnam era. The two different
versions in service are the gunship and the troop transport/training version. 5
Aviation Regiment has a fleet of five Iroquois gun ships that are used to clear
landing zones and support landing Black Hawks. Their weapon system includes
miniguns, rocket pods and twin machine guns in the doors. 1 Aviation Regiment
has 20 unmodified Iroquois that are used for troop transport and training.
While the Iroquois has been a very capable helicopter over the years, it is
becoming increasingly unreliable and expensive to maintain.
18. Kiowas. The Army, like the Navy, also operates the Bell
206B-1 Kiowas and has 40 remaining in service. The Army uses the Kiowa for visual
reconnaissance, scouting and personnel transfer. These helicopters, like the
Iroquois, are showing their age and the Army has introduced Army Project Air 87
to replace the capability.
19. Black Hawks. The Black Hawks were purchased by the RAAF and
then transferred to the Army. Of the 39 that were initially delivered, 36
remain in service mostly with 5 Aviation Regiment. The Australian variant is
known as the S-70A-9 and was assembled by Hawker de Havilland. Soon after
delivery, these aircraft were operated with extra equipment when compared to
the US Army fleet. Also, they were flown in the harsh northern Australian
conditions which varied from moist and salty air along the coast to hot and
dusty inland. These factors, combined with a shortage of long-lead items caused
serious availability problems in the early 1990s. The cost of conducting structural
repairs and purchasing more spares had not been planned for, and this caused a
budget crisis which resulted in very low availability rates in 1994/95. 5 The Army was just getting availability
back to an acceptable level when two Black Hawks collided in June 1996 during a
night counter-terrorist exercise.
20. The Black Hawks are extremely capable helicopters
for supporting Army operations. With the auxiliary fuel tanks fitted, they have
a range of 1600 kms which means they are capable of reaching any area of
operations (AO) in Australia without support. 6 When they arrive in an AO, they are
capable of transporting 10 troops with crashworthy seats or 18 troops without.
With the external stores support system (ESSS), both inboard stations can carry
1430 kgs and both outboard stations can carry 825 kgs. These stations can carry
a range of items including missiles, rockets, guns and fuel. Machine guns can also
be fitted to the two back seat crew positions to fire sideways and miniguns can
be fixed to fire forward. 7 The Black Hawks are also capable of carrying 3620 kgs of cargo and are
fully NVG compatible for night operations. An infantry company can be
transported in 20 Black Hawks.
21. Chinooks. The RAAF originally took delivery of 12 CH-47C
Chinooks in 1974. In 1989, the 11 remaining airframes were placed into storage as
an economy measure after the Black Hawks became operational. The Army found
that the Black Hawk could not fully take over the Chinook heavy lift
capability, so four were modified to CH-47D configuration and seven were sold
to the Hawaii National Guard. While there is no doubt that the CH-47D has
excellent capability for slinging oversize equipment, supplies and fuel, the
cost per aircraft to maintain a fleet of four is prohibitive. The Army desires
to sign a contract to increase the fleet size to six as soon as possible.
QUEST FOR A COMMON HELICOPTER AIRFRAME
22. As previously described, the ADF currently
operates eight different fleet types and has signed a contract for a ninth
type. Some of these fleets will need replacing in the near future; therefore, a
coordinated approach to fleet rationalisation is required to maximise air power
with a limited budget. These fiscal pressures are being felt by in many other countries,
so two overseas examples will be presented.
United States Navy
23. The USN intends to have a helicopter fleet
which is more capable but less expensive to own and operate into the next
century. 8 The cornerstone of their plan calls for the only non-Sikorsky helicopter
to be the Bell TH-57 which will only be used for training. They have made the
difficult decision to strive for commonality of rotary wing aircraft, and the
Seahawk is their operational 'frame of preference'. In the past, the USN had to
deal with Boeing for the CH-46s, Bell for the UH-1s, and Kaman for the SH-2Gs.
They still currently have a few Sikorsky H-3 Sea Kings, but all these fleets
will be retired and the USN will focus on different Hawk variants and the
Sikorsky CH-53 Sea Stallion.
24. There are several reasons for this decision.
The first is that the Seahawk is a proven airframe which has shown itself cable
of operating from different size surface vessels ranging from small frigates to
large aircraft carriers. The SH-60B variant has proven effective when flying from
small ships in an ASuW role and in a 'non-dipping' ASW role. The SH-60F variant
has proven effective when flying from aircraft carriers conducting the
'dipping' ASW role. As well, it can act in the SAR role as 'plane guard' when
the fighters are taking off and landing. The second reason is the desire to
have only one logistic and operational training chain in the future. The complexity
of the USN logistic chain will be much reduced with only one contractor to
provide rotary wing support for embarked helicopters.
25. One of the major operational concerns is
whether an H-60 Hawk can replace a CH-46D Boeing Vertol. The USN plans to
purchase 134 CH-60s to replace 70 CH-46Ds. The CH-60 Hawk is a naval utility
variant of the US Army's H-60 Black Hawk with folding rotor, folding tail,
improved gearbox and improved automatic flight control system. 9 The analysis that led to this decision
should be of great interest to the ADF because it is the desire for this same
heavy lift capability that led the Army to reintroduce the Chinook to service
26. Several years ago, the Canadian Army received
their air support from a fleet very similar fleet to that currently found in
the ARA. They employed seven CH-47C Boeing Chinooks for heavy lift, about 65
Bell Kiowas for scout and reconnaissance, and about 45 Twin Hueys
for troop transport. The cost to maintain the three different fleets was far
too high, and the logistic effort required to support the three fleets in the
field was not sustainable for long periods of operation. The decision was made to
replace these three fleets with one, and the specification would be based on
what was essential for the Army to carry out its tactical missions. The most
demanding task was to externally sling one particular artillery piece, but
while desirable to keep it in one piece, it did break into two pieces and could
be easily reassembled in the field.
27. In the early 1990s, a contract was signed with
Bell Textron to provide 100 militarised Bell 412 variants called the Canadian
Forces Utility Tactical and Transport Helicopter (CFUTTH). This aircraft is not
as capable as a Black Hawk, and problems have been encountered in making a
civilian helicopter combat capable. These aircraft are still being received,
but initial financial reports are encouraging as significant improvement has
been noticed. As would be expected, the number of courses to train aircrew and
groundcrew has been drastically reduced, and the number of uniformed personnel
required in the various headquarters to maintain configuration control has
reduced the three staffs to one. Also, Bell has accepted much of the
responsibility for technical airworthiness. One area of synergy that the CF does
not have is any potential commonality of airframe between the Army helicopter
and the prospective Maritime Helicopter Project (MHP). As the Bell 412 has
never been marinised, it is not a candidate aircraft for selection by the MHP
project team. The ADF, with both the RAN and ARA already operating a Hawk frame,
could make the next logical step which is to have a common frame for the entire
Australian Defence Force
28. The ADF, with the Seahawk and the Black Hawk,
already have two of the most versatile and capable helicopter frames in
military service in the world today. They share many common systems and parts.
A policy to encourage the adoption of a common ADF helicopter frame would have
to come from the highest levels. In the past, every project has received
funding separately, and while paying lip service to the cost of keeping an
aircraft in service for 25-30 years, the overriding concern has been the
initial capital costs. Those costs pale in comparison to life cycle costs, but
to save money in the long term, sometimes a little more must be paid up front.
29. RAN versus CF. It is very difficult to compare costs between
different defence forces; however, the RAN and the CF both have recently
implemented activity based costing. While different methods may have been used
for estimating the cost of spare parts and facilities, the cost of maintaining
four fleets can be compared to the cost of maintaining one. Table A-1 in Annex
A details the operating costs and flying hours of the single Canadian Sea King
fleet as compared to the RAN mixed fleet. When all factors are taken into
account, the RAN fleet is about 35 per cent more expensive per hour to operate.
This makes perfect sense because four fleets require more logistics, training,
simulators, software and coordination.
30. The first area where the mixed fleet causes the
RAN problems is in aircrew and groundcrew training. Training economies of scale
cannot be achieved because courses must be run with as few as one or two
students. This causes reduced instructor flexibility and numerous small
courses. The small numbers of qualified personnel leads to fragility each time
there is any personnel turnover. This results in more aircraft hours being used
for instruction and basic proficiency. Increased training hours mean fewer
hours available to the fleet commanders for embarked operations.
31. The second area of concern is logistics. A
costly inventory of similar, but non-exchangeable parts must be held. There are
different logistics channels for each aircraft, so extra personnel are required
to manage the inventories. As found in aircrew and groundcrew training, there
is a lack of economy of scale throughout the whole logistics process. The
introduction to RAN service of the Kaman SH-2G, another small fleet
manufactured by a fifth company, will compound these problems even more. While these
training and logistics issues have been highlighted for the RAN, the Army is
facing most of the same issues.
Flight Plan into the 21st Century
32. RAN Way Ahead. The ADF must control the costs of its rotary wing
aircraft to ensure a combat capability into the future. The first step should be
to cancel the $A600 million contract to purchase the SH-2Gs. While the
cancellation costs may seem high, many times this cost will be paid in the
future by introducing another airframe. The second step should be the purchase
of 14 Sikorsky Seahawks giving a total fleet size of 30 which would be
sufficient for the six FFG7s and the eight ANZAC class frigates. Even if all 14
air detachments were fully manned, ten airframes would remain for training, maintenance,
or deployment to the AOR. This arrival of additional Seahawks would also allow
for the retirement of the Kiowas and the return of the Squirrels to basic
helicopter training. Functions such as support to oceanographic research vessels
which could not be done by the Seahawks should be contracted out using the
Commercial Support Program (CSP).
33. As the ADF currently lacks the capability to
conduct 'active dipping' during ASW operations, this purchase of 14 additional
Seahawks would be an excellent opportunity to procure tethered sonars. A mix of
'dippers' and 'non-dippers' would be an excellent asset for the Task Force
Commander to employ. Experience in the CF and the USN has shown that this mix
enhances ASW operations.
34. The third and final step to complete the RAN
transition to a complete Hawk fleet would be the acquisition of eight CH-60s
for supporting HMAS Kanimbla and Manoora. These Hawks are the naval utility variant which the USN is purchasing to
replace their CH-47D Chinooks for embarked operations. As an interim measure,
the Sea Kings with their folding blades and pylon could be used for this task,
but they are not an acceptable long term solution. Placing Black Hawks on these
vessels would result in heavy wear and tear, and marinising Black Hawks does not
make sense since it is cost prohibitive and they are already in such short
supply to support land operations. This final purchase would complete the RAN
fleet with a total of 38 naval Hawks.
35. Army Way Ahead. The Army also must control its rotary wing costs
through airframe rationalisation. The first step should be to remove the
Iroquois gunships from service immediately to save money. Employing these airframes
during the firing of high calibre ammunition over the years has taken its toll,
and they are not cost effective to keep in service. The Iroquois gunship
capability to support operations would eventually be replaced with the
acquisition of additional Black Hawks.
36. The major acquisition for the Army should be 40
AH-60A attack Black Hawks and 40 standard Black Hawks with a configuration as
close as possible to the S-70A-9. These newly acquired helicopters would
provide reconnaissance, fire support troop transfer, and external lift. The
attack Black Hawks carry Hellfire antitank missiles, two 30 mm cannons, two
miniguns and two 19-round rocket pod. 10 They can match the contenders for Army Project Air 87 in air-to-ground
attack capability, and are much more versatile for other types of employment.
This would allow for the retirement of the Kiowa, the standard Iroquois, and
the selling off of the Chinook fleets. The contract to purchase Chinooks number
five and six should not be signed. This would leave the Army a Black Hawk fleet
of 116 helicopters which would have critical mass for all facets of support.
37. The most controversial portion of this flight
plan will be to have the Black Hawk take over the Chinook heavy lift mission.
This has already been attempted by Army, and was judged unsuccessful.
Therefore, if one additional airframe is to remain in service, it should be the
Chinook for heavy lift. If the Chinook remains in service, then the two
additional aircraft being considered should be acquired to bring the fleet size
up to a level that can be more economically sustained. With 6 Chinooks in
service, about 10 fewer Black Hawks would need to be acquired.
38. Today, the ADF finds itself at a
crossroads in the provision of rotary wing air power to support the RAN and the
ARA. The path that is currently being followed calls for each rotary wing
function to be considered independently. In the past, this has resulted in the
acquisition of small fleets of helicopters with narrow roles. This process also
has not adequately considered all of the problems placed on the organisation
involved with bringing another small fleet into service. Reflecting on the
past, it can be seen that the initial acquisition costs involved with bringing
a weapon system into service pale in comparison to the life cycle costs
involved with fleet operation for 25-30 years. The ADF should follow the path
of reducing the number of fleets in service if it wishes to remain
cost-effective and combat capable into the 21st century.
39. To provide the ADF with
cost-effective and combat capable rotary wing airpower into the 21st century, it
is recommended that:
a. the ADF adopt a philosophy at the highest
levels to reduce the number of rotary wing aircraft fleets to an absolute
b. the ADF accept that the common airframe
for the foreseeable future be the Sikorsky Hawk;
c. the RAN cancel the recently signed contract
to purchase 11 Kaman Sea Sprites and immediately purchase additional Seahawks
for the ANZAC class frigates;
d. the RAN purchase the naval utility Hawk
variant (CH-60) to support HMAS Kanimbla and Manoora and remove the Sea Kings from service;
e. the RAN remove the Kiowas from
f. the RAN return the Squirrels to the
training role when additional Seahawks arrive leaving the RAN with a complete
g. the ARA remove the Iroquois gunships
from service immediately;
h. the ARA purchase attack Black Hawks (AH-60A)
to provide reconnaissance and fire support and not purchase a different fleet
of attack helicopters from a different manufacturer under Army Project Air 87;
i. the ARA not sign the contract for two more CH-47D
j. the ARA purchase more Black Hawks to
allow for the retirement of the Kiowa and Iroquois fleet, and to conduct the
heavy lift that has recently been reassumed by the Chinooks; and
k. the ARA sell the four CH-47D
Chinooks when the additional Black Hawks have arrived leaving the ARA with a
J. J. MCMANUS
RAAF CSC 50
10 October 1997
Notes and Acknowledgements
1. Future Directions for the Management of Australia's Defence, Defence Centre, Canberra ACT, 1997, pp. 1-4.
2. Bennett, J., N22 - Aerospatiale AS 350B Squirrel, in Australian Aviation, December 1996, p. 34.
3. Bennett. J., N24 - Sikorsky S-70B-2Seahawk, in Australian Aviation, January/February 1997, p. 48.
4. Grazebrook, A. W., Wisely or Unwisely, Australia Chooses its Helicopters, in Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter, April/May 1997, p. 4.
5. Lee, N., Black Hawk Accident Findings Awaited as Inquiry Ends, in Australian Aviation, January/February 1997, p. 60.
6. The Hawk airframe has excellent range, and with refuelling, can carry out very long range missions. This capability was demonstrated in December 1994 when a Ukrainian merchant seaman was adrift in the North Atlantic about 750 nautical miles off the coast of Nova Scotia. While the position of the sinking ship and survivor was known, the winter seas were so cruel that the seaman would not survive until a ship rescue could be mounted. The US Air Force responded by providing two HH-60G Pave Hawks that had been designed to carry out long range combat search and rescue missions. Using air-to-air refuelling, the pair flew a 14.5 hour mission that covered 1560 nautical miles to rescue the lone sailor.
7. Donaldson, P., Bullets to Bandages, in Defence Helicopter, Vol. 16: No. 2: June - August 1997, Sikorsky Profile, p. vi.
8. Crouse, G. B., The Navy's Grand Mod (Sikorsky) Plan, in Rotor & Wing, May 1997, p. 20.
9. Donaldson, P., Seahawk Evolution, in Defence Helicopter, Vol. 16: No. 2: June - August 1997, Sikorsky Profile, p. xii.
10. Frawley, G., US Army Unveils Attack Black Hawk, in Australian Aviation, June 1995, p. 79.
Bennett, J., N22 - Aerospatiale AS 350B Squirrel, in Australian Aviation, December 1996.
Bennett. J., N24 - Sikorsky S-70B-2Seahawk, in Australian Aviation, January/February 1997.
Crouse, G. B., The Navy's Grand Mod (Sikorsky) Plan, in Rotor & Wing, May 1997.
Donaldson, P., Bullets to Bandages, Defence Helicopter, Vol. 16: No. 2: June - August
Donaldson, P., Seahawk Evolution, in Defence
Helicopter, Vol. 16: No. 2: June - August 1997.
Frawley, G., US Army Unveils Attack Black Hawk, in Australian Aviation, June 1995.
Future Directions for the Management of Australia's
Defence, Defence Centre, Canberra ACT, 1997.
Grazebrook, A. W., Wisely or Unwisely, Australia Chooses its Helicopters, in Asia-Pacific DefenceReporter,
Lee, N., Black Hawk Accident Findings Awaited as Inquiry Ends, in Australian Aviation, January/February1997.
Scott. R., Helicopters for Anti-submarine and Anti-surface Warfare - A Regional
Perspective, in Asian Military
Review, June 1993.
Annex A to
Cost Comparison between Canadian and Australian
Maintenance and Fuel
per Flying Hour
(CF Sea King = 1)
The Canadian Maritime Helicopter information was
obtained from the Director Air Requirements Maritime and Rotary (DARMR) and are
based on the 1996/7 fiscal year which ended 31 March 1997.
The RAN information was obtained from the Activity
Based Management (ABM) Project and is the time period 1 January - 31 March 1997
extrapolated over a full calendar year.
The Australian Dollar and the Canadian Dollar are
both floating currencies but are very close to par. As of 25 September 1997,
$A1.000 is equal to $C1.003 so any currency differences are not significant.