SC 10/26/Air

RATIONALISATION OF ROTARY WING AIRCRAFT IN THE ADF

INTRODUCTION

Background

1. The objectives of the Defence Evaluation Review (DER) were to shape management practices for the future, forge links with industry, and through these processes and other efficiencies, free up resources for the development of combat power. The Defence Reform Programme (DRP) was the process to implement these changes and allow resources to be transferred from the 'blunt end' to the 'sharp end' of the ADF. The ADF must not rest on its laurels if it wishes to extract savings while achieving new capability, and maintaining its existing capability in an increasingly complex environment with new uncertainties.¹

2. An important element of air power within the ADF is provided by the rotary wing aircraft currently operated by the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) and the Australian Regular Army (ARA). While the number of actual helicopters in the ADF is low compared to larger military forces, the RAN currently operates four helicopter types and has signed a contract for a fifth type. The ARA currently operates four helicopter fleets and has expressed interest in other types for battlefield support. In the cost-driven climate that the ADF is now operating in, it should be possible to conduct the required operational tasks with significantly fewer helicopter types.

3. Tooth-to-Tail Ratio. It must be remembered that each different operational aircraft type carries with it a 'tail' that is significantly more expensive over the life of the aircraft than was the initial procurement cost. This 'tail' consists of the cost of aircrew and groundcrew training as well as the logistic support system including engineering and supply. Many of these costs are not dependent on the number of aircraft in service so the greater number of helicopter fleets in service, the worse will be the 'tooth-to-tail' ratio. One of the easiest ways to maximise this 'tooth-to tail' ratio is to consolidate rotary wing fleets to the absolute minimum number of aircraft types possible.

Scope

4. This paper will describe the current status of the rotary wing aircraft types in the ADF. Then, foreign examples of fleet rationalisation and options for reducing the number of ADF fleets will be discussed. Finally, the paper will conclude with recommendations which would provide combat capable rotary wing assets given the current ADF fiscal constraints. This paper will not address the detailed costs of either the current fleets or the proposed solutions as it is seeking to provide a conceptual base for future rotary wing acquisitions and decisions.

AIM

5. The aim of this service paper is to determine how best to provide the ADF with cost-effective and combat capable rotary wing aircraft into the 21st century.

ADF ROTARY WING AIRCRAFT CURRENT SITUATION

6. The ability to project air power using helicopters is essential to both the ARA and the RAN. For the ARA, the current fleets do not just provide desired air support, they represent a primary manoeuvre element which is vital to ground combat power. Embarked helicopters give a RAN Task Group Commander the ability to fight the war using the element of surprise and without placing valuable surface assets in danger. In the event of a submarine threat, the vulnerable warships can escape leaving the helicopters to employ their advantages of speed and mobility to prosecute the submarine.

7. In a world not constrained by either personnel numbers or fiscal resources, it may be desirable to have a different airframe, avionics fit, weapon system and aircrew for every task. Much time is spent on discussing the required helicopter fleet size to achieve critical mass in different military forces. Calculating the fleet size to provide critical mass is a function of many different variables and can be quite subjective.

8. General consensus in the Canadian Forces (CF) and United States Navy (USN) is that a fleet needs to have more than 30 helicopters in operation so that the engineering, supply and training costs can be fully amortised. As the USN fleet of H-3 Sea Kings dropped from hundreds to 35, they ceased some of their own depot level maintenance and married up with the Canadian contractors already maintaining Canadian Sea Kings. The drop below critical mass led them to let contracts to Spar for gearboxes and IMP for flight avionics.

9. Fleets below 10 helicopters are generally considered too cost-prohibitive to operate and are only maintained if there is no absolutely no other alternative. Assuming that the ADF accepted the requirement to have more than a 30-helicopter fleet in service, only the ARA Black Hawk and Kiowa fleets would have the 'critical mass' to justify overall weapon system costs.

Navy Helicopters

10. Sea Kings. These 1960's generation helicopters were designed by Sikorsky, built by Westland, and purchased for their anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capability along with secondary roles of search and rescue (SAR) and utility. They were operated from the aircraft carrier HMAS Melbourne. After the carrier was removed from service, they have essentially been shore-based and the remaining seven have had most of their ASW equipment removed. The most important capability that the ADF lost was the ability to 'dip' using the AN/AQS-13 variable depth active sonar. A medium frequency variable depth dipping sonar like the AN/AQS-13 is essential for detecting, localising and attacking conventional submarines in littoral waters. The Sea Kings are now employed primarily for utility with a secondary role of SAR.

11. Kiowas. The Bell 206B-1 Kiowas were purchased in 1971 for both the Army and the Navy. The first 12 were imported and the remaining 44 were assembled in Australia by Commonwealth Aircraft Corporation (CAC). A RAN Kiowa was first used for embarked operations when an air detachment was formed in HMAS Adelaide for a deployment to RIMPAC 84; however, they are no longer operated from the FFG7 Adelaide class frigates. The RAN currently operates three Kiowas and they are used for vertical replenishing (VERTREP), inserting and extracting survey teams, and SAR. HMAS Moresby has one Kiowa attached full time when conducting oceanographic survey.

12. Squirrels. The AS 350B Squirrel was designed and built in France by Aerospatiale as a replacement for the Alouette. This RAN model first flew in 1984 and was delivered to HMAS Albatross for pilot conversion and fleet support. The RAN first embarked the Squirrel in 1985 and modified it for sea operations by adding floats, a hoist and a Doppler navigation system. The fleet of six was used to provide interim air capability awaiting the Seahawks, and are now used as the second helicopter on the FFG7 Adelaide class frigates. Two Squirrels saw action in the Persian Gulf. With a toned down paint scheme and a 7.62 mm machine gun, they were nicknamed the 'Battle Budgies'. ²

13. Seahawks. The Australian S-70B-2 Seahawk is an export derivative of the US SH-60B LAMPS Mark III and the fleet of 16 have a unique weapons fit. The Australian version was ordered in 1984 and first flew in 1987. Due to delays in prototype testing, they were not delivered until 1991. ³ Flight testing is still being carried out on the primary tactical and navigation functions of the Seahawk. They are capable of autonomous ASW using their sonobuoy processor (Computing Devices Canada AN/UYS-503) and their magnetic anomaly detector (CAE AN/ASQ-504V). They can conduct anti-surface warfare (ASuW) surveillance, targeting and attacking independent of their parent ship. These aircraft were purchased to be embarked on the FFG7 Adelaide class frigates, and when not embarked, are based at HMAS Albatross. The first four FFG7s were built in the US and their ship-helicopter interface was designed for the Kaman SH-2G. The late decision to purchase Seahawks meant that flight deck modifications were required to embark the Seahawk.

14. Super Sea Sprite Purchase. After considering the RAN helicopters that are currently in service, it is necessary to discuss those under contract. On 17 January 1997, Australia signed a contract to purchase a different helicopter type for the ANZAC frigates. Even though the ship-helicopter interface on the ANZAC was designed for the Sikorsky Seahawk, the decision was made to purchase 11 Kaman SH-2G Super Sea Sprites. These SH-2G helicopters have been removed from service by the USN, and are only currently in service with the Arab Republic of Egypt. The Egyptian Navy is hardly a bluewater Navy, and received their SH-2Gs in a special arrangement through the United States Foreign Military Sales (FMS) when the USN no longer required them. The Royal New Zealand Navy (RNZN) followed Australia's lead and signed a contract for SH-2Gs on 11 March 1997. New Zealand, however, did not design their ANZAC ship-helicopter interface for the Seahawk and had no interest in an aircraft the size of a Seahawk as the RNZN only embarks small rotary wing aircraft on their warships.

15. The rationale for the RAN decision to purchase a small helicopter instead of the Seahawk was given as desire for commonality of airframes if helicopters were purchased for the proposed Offshore Patrol Combatant (OPC). Also, it had been expected that the RAN would purchase 14 helicopters for the eight ANZAC frigates. The introduction of only 11 aircraft of a unique type will cause major problems well into the future. When allowance is made for two or three in light and heavy maintenance, it can be predicted that there will be a constant turmoil between training and operations. A fleet this size, spread over eight combatants, is a recipe for future logistic and training problems.

16. The decision to choose the SH-2G instead of a Seahawk means that the ANZAC frigate will have a significantly reduced fighting capability. Most Navies in the world choose to place as large a helicopter as possible onboard a frigate to maximise combat effectiveness. The operational payload of the SH-2G (1800 kgs) is just over half that of a Seahawk (3000 kgs), and this factor becomes critical during over-the-horizon ASuW operations. A Seahawk can carry two Penguin air-to-surface missiles, while the SH-2G can carry only one with sufficient fuel to conduct an ASuW mission. The ANZAC frigate, unlike the FFG7 Adelaide class frigates, is capable of carrying only one embarked helicopter. It becomes obvious that an ASuW encounter with even two combat units could be disastrous. The ANZAC frigate project team was forward thinking when it allowed 'room for growth' onboard the ship. ⁴ An S-70B-2 would have allowed the ANZAC helicopter project team that same room for growth. Growth has been required on almost every embarked helicopter in the past, and could be crucial in the field of ASW if the RAN decides in future to resume active dipping with a tethered sonar.

Army Helicopters

17. Iroquois. The Bell UH-1H Iroquois is a 1960's generation helicopter purchased by the RAAF during the Vietnam era. The two different versions in service are the gunship and the troop transport/training version. 5 Aviation Regiment has a fleet of five Iroquois gun ships that are used to clear landing zones and support landing Black Hawks. Their weapon system includes miniguns, rocket pods and twin machine guns in the doors. 1 Aviation Regiment has 20 unmodified Iroquois that are used for troop transport and training. While the Iroquois has been a very capable helicopter over the years, it is becoming increasingly unreliable and expensive to maintain.

18. Kiowas. The Army, like the Navy, also operates the Bell 206B-1 Kiowas and has 40 remaining in service. The Army uses the Kiowa for visual reconnaissance, scouting and personnel transfer. These helicopters, like the Iroquois, are showing their age and the Army has introduced Army Project Air 87 to replace the capability.

19. Black Hawks. The Black Hawks were purchased by the RAAF and then transferred to the Army. Of the 39 that were initially delivered, 36 remain in service mostly with 5 Aviation Regiment. The Australian variant is known as the S-70A-9 and was assembled by Hawker de Havilland. Soon after delivery, these aircraft were operated with extra equipment when compared to the US Army fleet. Also, they were flown in the harsh northern Australian conditions which varied from moist and salty air along the coast to hot and dusty inland. These factors, combined with a shortage of long-lead items caused serious availability problems in the early 1990s. The cost of conducting structural repairs and purchasing more spares had not been planned for, and this caused a budget crisis which resulted in very low availability rates in 1994/95. ⁵ The Army was just getting availability back to an acceptable level when two Black Hawks collided in June 1996 during a night counter-terrorist exercise.

20. The Black Hawks are extremely capable helicopters for supporting Army operations. With the auxiliary fuel tanks fitted, they have a range of 1600 kms which means they are capable of reaching any area of operations (AO) in Australia without support. ⁶ When they arrive in an AO, they are capable of transporting 10 troops with crashworthy seats or 18 troops without. With the external stores support system (ESSS), both inboard stations can carry 1430 kgs and both outboard stations can carry 825 kgs. These stations can carry a range of items including missiles, rockets, guns and fuel. Machine guns can also be fitted to the two back seat crew positions to fire sideways and miniguns can be fixed to fire forward. ⁷ The Black Hawks are also capable of carrying 3620 kgs of cargo and are fully NVG compatible for night operations. An infantry company can be transported in 20 Black Hawks.

21. Chinooks. The RAAF originally took delivery of 12 CH-47C Chinooks in 1974. In 1989, the 11 remaining airframes were placed into storage as an economy measure after the Black Hawks became operational. The Army found that the Black Hawk could not fully take over the Chinook heavy lift capability, so four were modified to CH-47D configuration and seven were sold to the Hawaii National Guard. While there is no doubt that the CH-47D has excellent capability for slinging oversize equipment, supplies and fuel, the cost per aircraft to maintain a fleet of four is prohibitive. The Army desires to sign a contract to increase the fleet size to six as soon as possible.

QUEST FOR A COMMON HELICOPTER AIRFRAME

22. As previously described, the ADF currently operates eight different fleet types and has signed a contract for a ninth type. Some of these fleets will need replacing in the near future; therefore, a coordinated approach to fleet rationalisation is required to maximise air power with a limited budget. These fiscal pressures are being felt by in many other countries, so two overseas examples will be presented.

United States Navy

23. The USN intends to have a helicopter fleet which is more capable but less expensive to own and operate into the next century. ⁸ The cornerstone of their plan calls for the only non-Sikorsky helicopter to be the Bell TH-57 which will only be used for training. They have made the difficult decision to strive for commonality of rotary wing aircraft, and the Seahawk is their operational 'frame of preference'. In the past, the USN had to deal with Boeing for the CH-46s, Bell for the UH-1s, and Kaman for the SH-2Gs. They still currently have a few Sikorsky H-3 Sea Kings, but all these fleets will be retired and the USN will focus on different Hawk variants and the Sikorsky CH-53 Sea Stallion.

24. There are several reasons for this decision. The first is that the Seahawk is a proven airframe which has shown itself cable of operating from different size surface vessels ranging from small frigates to large aircraft carriers. The SH-60B variant has proven effective when flying from small ships in an ASuW role and in a 'non-dipping' ASW role. The SH-60F variant has proven effective when flying from aircraft carriers conducting the 'dipping' ASW role. As well, it can act in the SAR role as 'plane guard' when the fighters are taking off and landing. The second reason is the desire to have only one logistic and operational training chain in the future. The complexity of the USN logistic chain will be much reduced with only one contractor to provide rotary wing support for embarked helicopters.

25. One of the major operational concerns is whether an H-60 Hawk can replace a CH-46D Boeing Vertol. The USN plans to purchase 134 CH-60s to replace 70 CH-46Ds. The CH-60 Hawk is a naval utility variant of the US Army's H-60 Black Hawk with folding rotor, folding tail, improved gearbox and improved automatic flight control system. ⁹ The analysis that led to this decision should be of great interest to the ADF because it is the desire for this same heavy lift capability that led the Army to reintroduce the Chinook to service in 1996.

Canadian Forces

26. Several years ago, the Canadian Army received their air support from a fleet very similar fleet to that currently found in the ARA. They employed seven CH-47C Boeing Chinooks for heavy lift, about 65 Bell Kiowas for scout and reconnaissance, and about 45 Twin Hueys for troop transport. The cost to maintain the three different fleets was far too high, and the logistic effort required to support the three fleets in the field was not sustainable for long periods of operation. The decision was made to replace these three fleets with one, and the specification would be based on what was essential for the Army to carry out its tactical missions. The most demanding task was to externally sling one particular artillery piece, but while desirable to keep it in one piece, it did break into two pieces and could be easily reassembled in the field.

27. In the early 1990s, a contract was signed with Bell Textron to provide 100 militarised Bell 412 variants called the Canadian Forces Utility Tactical and Transport Helicopter (CFUTTH). This aircraft is not as capable as a Black Hawk, and problems have been encountered in making a civilian helicopter combat capable. These aircraft are still being received, but initial financial reports are encouraging as significant improvement has been noticed. As would be expected, the number of courses to train aircrew and groundcrew has been drastically reduced, and the number of uniformed personnel required in the various headquarters to maintain configuration control has reduced the three staffs to one. Also, Bell has accepted much of the responsibility for technical airworthiness. One area of synergy that the CF does not have is any potential commonality of airframe between the Army helicopter and the prospective Maritime Helicopter Project (MHP). As the Bell 412 has never been marinised, it is not a candidate aircraft for selection by the MHP project team. The ADF, with both the RAN and ARA already operating a Hawk frame, could make the next logical step which is to have a common frame for the entire force.

Australian Defence Force

28. The ADF, with the Seahawk and the Black Hawk, already have two of the most versatile and capable helicopter frames in military service in the world today. They share many common systems and parts. A policy to encourage the adoption of a common ADF helicopter frame would have to come from the highest levels. In the past, every project has received funding separately, and while paying lip service to the cost of keeping an aircraft in service for 25-30 years, the overriding concern has been the initial capital costs. Those costs pale in comparison to life cycle costs, but to save money in the long term, sometimes a little more must be paid up front.

29. RAN versus CF. It is very difficult to compare costs between different defence forces; however, the RAN and the CF both have recently implemented activity based costing. While different methods may have been used for estimating the cost of spare parts and facilities, the cost of maintaining four fleets can be compared to the cost of maintaining one. Table A-1 in Annex A details the operating costs and flying hours of the single Canadian Sea King fleet as compared to the RAN mixed fleet. When all factors are taken into account, the RAN fleet is about 35 per cent more expensive per hour to operate. This makes perfect sense because four fleets require more logistics, training, simulators, software and coordination.

30. The first area where the mixed fleet causes the RAN problems is in aircrew and groundcrew training. Training economies of scale cannot be achieved because courses must be run with as few as one or two students. This causes reduced instructor flexibility and numerous small courses. The small numbers of qualified personnel leads to fragility each time there is any personnel turnover. This results in more aircraft hours being used for instruction and basic proficiency. Increased training hours mean fewer hours available to the fleet commanders for embarked operations.

31. The second area of concern is logistics. A costly inventory of similar, but non-exchangeable parts must be held. There are different logistics channels for each aircraft, so extra personnel are required to manage the inventories. As found in aircrew and groundcrew training, there is a lack of economy of scale throughout the whole logistics process. The introduction to RAN service of the Kaman SH-2G, another small fleet manufactured by a fifth company, will compound these problems even more. While these training and logistics issues have been highlighted for the RAN, the Army is facing most of the same issues.

Flight Plan into the 21st Century

32. RAN Way Ahead. The ADF must control the costs of its rotary wing aircraft to ensure a combat capability into the future. The first step should be to cancel the $A600 million contract to purchase the SH-2Gs. While the cancellation costs may seem high, many times this cost will be paid in the future by introducing another airframe. The second step should be the purchase of 14 Sikorsky Seahawks giving a total fleet size of 30 which would be sufficient for the six FFG7s and the eight ANZAC class frigates. Even if all 14 air detachments were fully manned, ten airframes would remain for training, maintenance, or deployment to the AOR. This arrival of additional Seahawks would also allow for the retirement of the Kiowas and the return of the Squirrels to basic helicopter training. Functions such as support to oceanographic research vessels which could not be done by the Seahawks should be contracted out using the Commercial Support Program (CSP).

33. As the ADF currently lacks the capability to conduct 'active dipping' during ASW operations, this purchase of 14 additional Seahawks would be an excellent opportunity to procure tethered sonars. A mix of 'dippers' and 'non-dippers' would be an excellent asset for the Task Force Commander to employ. Experience in the CF and the USN has shown that this mix enhances ASW operations.

34. The third and final step to complete the RAN transition to a complete Hawk fleet would be the acquisition of eight CH-60s for supporting HMAS Kanimbla and Manoora. These Hawks are the naval utility variant which the USN is purchasing to replace their CH-47D Chinooks for embarked operations. As an interim measure, the Sea Kings with their folding blades and pylon could be used for this task, but they are not an acceptable long term solution. Placing Black Hawks on these vessels would result in heavy wear and tear, and marinising Black Hawks does not make sense since it is cost prohibitive and they are already in such short supply to support land operations. This final purchase would complete the RAN fleet with a total of 38 naval Hawks.

35. Army Way Ahead. The Army also must control its rotary wing costs through airframe rationalisation. The first step should be to remove the Iroquois gunships from service immediately to save money. Employing these airframes during the firing of high calibre ammunition over the years has taken its toll, and they are not cost effective to keep in service. The Iroquois gunship capability to support operations would eventually be replaced with the acquisition of additional Black Hawks.

36. The major acquisition for the Army should be 40 AH-60A attack Black Hawks and 40 standard Black Hawks with a configuration as close as possible to the S-70A-9. These newly acquired helicopters would provide reconnaissance, fire support troop transfer, and external lift. The attack Black Hawks carry Hellfire antitank missiles, two 30 mm cannons, two miniguns and two 19-round rocket pod. ¹⁰ They can match the contenders for Army Project Air 87 in air-to-ground attack capability, and are much more versatile for other types of employment. This would allow for the retirement of the Kiowa, the standard Iroquois, and the selling off of the Chinook fleets. The contract to purchase Chinooks number five and six should not be signed. This would leave the Army a Black Hawk fleet of 116 helicopters which would have critical mass for all facets of support.

37. The most controversial portion of this flight plan will be to have the Black Hawk take over the Chinook heavy lift mission. This has already been attempted by Army, and was judged unsuccessful. Therefore, if one additional airframe is to remain in service, it should be the Chinook for heavy lift. If the Chinook remains in service, then the two additional aircraft being considered should be acquired to bring the fleet size up to a level that can be more economically sustained. With 6 Chinooks in service, about 10 fewer Black Hawks would need to be acquired.

CONCLUSION

38. Today, the ADF finds itself at a crossroads in the provision of rotary wing air power to support the RAN and the ARA. The path that is currently being followed calls for each rotary wing function to be considered independently. In the past, this has resulted in the acquisition of small fleets of helicopters with narrow roles. This process also has not adequately considered all of the problems placed on the organisation involved with bringing another small fleet into service. Reflecting on the past, it can be seen that the initial acquisition costs involved with bringing a weapon system into service pale in comparison to the life cycle costs involved with fleet operation for 25-30 years. The ADF should follow the path of reducing the number of fleets in service if it wishes to remain cost-effective and combat capable into the 21st century.

RECOMMENDATIONS

39. To provide the ADF with cost-effective and combat capable rotary wing airpower into the 21st century, it is recommended that:

a. the ADF adopt a philosophy at the highest levels to reduce the number of rotary wing aircraft fleets to an absolute minimum;

b. the ADF accept that the common airframe for the foreseeable future be the Sikorsky Hawk;

c. the RAN cancel the recently signed contract to purchase 11 Kaman Sea Sprites and immediately purchase additional Seahawks for the ANZAC class frigates;

d. the RAN purchase the naval utility Hawk variant (CH-60) to support HMAS Kanimbla and Manoora and remove the Sea Kings from service;

e. the RAN remove the Kiowas from service;

f. the RAN return the Squirrels to the training role when additional Seahawks arrive leaving the RAN with a complete Hawk fleet;

g. the ARA remove the Iroquois gunships from service immediately;

h. the ARA purchase attack Black Hawks (AH-60A) to provide reconnaissance and fire support and not purchase a different fleet of attack helicopters from a different manufacturer under Army Project Air 87;

i. the ARA not sign the contract for two more CH-47D Chinooks;

j. the ARA purchase more Black Hawks to allow for the retirement of the Kiowa and Iroquois fleet, and to conduct the heavy lift that has recently been reassumed by the Chinooks; and

k. the ARA sell the four CH-47D Chinooks when the additional Black Hawks have arrived leaving the ARA with a Hawk fleet.

J. J. MCMANUS
Major
RAAF CSC 50
Canberra
10 October 1997

Notes and Acknowledgements

1. Future Directions for the Management of Australia's Defence, Defence Centre, Canberra ACT, 1997, pp. 1-4.

2. Bennett, J., N22 - Aerospatiale AS 350B Squirrel, in Australian Aviation, December 1996, p. 34.

3. Bennett. J., N24 - Sikorsky S-70B-2Seahawk, in Australian Aviation, January/February 1997, p. 48.

4. Grazebrook, A. W., Wisely or Unwisely, Australia Chooses its Helicopters, in Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter, April/May 1997, p. 4.

5. Lee, N., Black Hawk Accident Findings Awaited as Inquiry Ends, in Australian Aviation, January/February 1997, p. 60.

6. The Hawk airframe has excellent range, and with refuelling, can carry out very long range missions. This capability was demonstrated in December 1994 when a Ukrainian merchant seaman was adrift in the North Atlantic about 750 nautical miles off the coast of Nova Scotia. While the position of the sinking ship and survivor was known, the winter seas were so cruel that the seaman would not survive until a ship rescue could be mounted. The US Air Force responded by providing two HH-60G Pave Hawks that had been designed to carry out long range combat search and rescue missions. Using air-to-air refuelling, the pair flew a 14.5 hour mission that covered 1560 nautical miles to rescue the lone sailor.

7. Donaldson, P., Bullets to Bandages, in Defence Helicopter, Vol. 16: No. 2: June - August 1997, Sikorsky Profile, p. vi.

8. Crouse, G. B., The Navy's Grand Mod (Sikorsky) Plan, in Rotor & Wing, May 1997, p. 20.

9. Donaldson, P., Seahawk Evolution, in Defence Helicopter, Vol. 16: No. 2: June - August 1997, Sikorsky Profile, p. xii.

10. Frawley, G., US Army Unveils Attack Black Hawk, in Australian Aviation, June 1995, p. 79.

Bibliography

Bennett, J., N22 - Aerospatiale AS 350B Squirrel, in Australian Aviation, December 1996.

Bennett. J., N24 - Sikorsky S-70B-2Seahawk, in Australian Aviation, January/February 1997.

Crouse, G. B., The Navy's Grand Mod (Sikorsky) Plan, in Rotor & Wing, May 1997.

Donaldson, P., Bullets to Bandages, Defence Helicopter, Vol. 16: No. 2: June - August 1997.

Donaldson, P., Seahawk Evolution, in Defence Helicopter, Vol. 16: No. 2: June - August 1997.

Frawley, G., US Army Unveils Attack Black Hawk, in Australian Aviation, June 1995.

Future Directions for the Management of Australia's Defence, Defence Centre, Canberra ACT, 1997.

Grazebrook, A. W., Wisely or Unwisely, Australia Chooses its Helicopters, in Asia-Pacific DefenceReporter, April/May 1997.

Lee, N., Black Hawk Accident Findings Awaited as Inquiry Ends, in Australian Aviation, January/February1997.

Scott. R., Helicopters for Anti-submarine and Anti-surface Warfare - A Regional Perspective, in Asian Military Review, June 1993.

Annex A to

SC 10/26/Air

Cost Comparison between Canadian and Australian Maritime Helicopters

	CF Sea Kings	RAN Mixed Fleet
Engineering, Maintenance and Fuel	$C 55 M	$A 50 M
Facilities and Personnel	$C 50 M	$A 40 M
Fleet Costs	$C 105 M	$A 90 M
Flying Hours	11,000	7,000
Cost per Flying Hour	$C 9,500	$A 13,000
Ratio (CF Sea King = 1)	1	1.35

Table A-1

Notes:

The Canadian Maritime Helicopter information was obtained from the Director Air Requirements Maritime and Rotary (DARMR) and are based on the 1996/7 fiscal year which ended 31 March 1997.

The RAN information was obtained from the Activity Based Management (ABM) Project and is the time period 1 January - 31 March 1997 extrapolated over a full calendar year.

The Australian Dollar and the Canadian Dollar are both floating currencies but are very close to par. As of 25 September 1997, $A1.000 is equal to $C1.003 so any currency differences are not significant.